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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamics of housing returns in Singapore. We first extract
the movements of Singapore’s economic aggregates that are free from foreign (U.S.
and rest of the world) factors, and then examine the determinants of its housing
returns. We find that both the domestic variables (such as GDP growth rate,
volume of international trade, and exchange rate) and U.S. variables (such as the
Federal Fund Rate and the External Finance Premium) are important during the
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boom regime. The bust regime is very diﬀerent. Directions for future research are
discussed.
Key words: house price, international transmission mechanism, regime-switching,
regime-dependent response, two-stage procedure.
JEL classification: E30, F40, G10
1 Introduction
Real estate markets played important role in recent crises, including the Asian financial
crisis (AFC hereafter) in the late 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC
hereafter).1 Academics and policy makers are thus very eager to answer the following
questions. (1) What determines the real estate prices? (2) How can the real estate cycles
be predicted? (3) What and can government policies do to “stabilize” real estate cycles,
and how can they do it? To address these questions is clearly a non-trivial task for large
economies such as the United States.2 It may be even more diﬃcult for small economies,
as they are subject to shocks from the domestic economy as well as from the rest of the
world.
This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by studying the Singaporean
housing market. Several justifications are in order. First, Singapore experienced the AFC
and resumed economic growth soon after.3 This enables us to study the “mean-reversion”
behavior of the economy and the asset markets. Second, consistent with casual obser-
vations, previous studies have confirmed that the Singaporean economy is significantly
aﬀected by external shocks.4 Third, some recent studies suggest that there is a “balance
sheet channel” for a shock to propagate in the Singaporean macro-economy, as well as
those of other Asian countries.5
In addition, the specific approach of this paper will complement existing studies on
1The literature on the cause of the AFC is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see the review
of Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Mera and Renaud
(2000) and the reference therein.
2Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review that literature. Among others, see Bossaerts
and Hillion (1999), David and Fagan (1997), Estrella (2005), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella
and Mishkin (1997), Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004).
3Among others, see Tse and Leung (2002), Devereux (2003).
4Among others, see Abeysinghe (1998), Cheung and Yuen (2002), Mackowiak (2007), Meng (2003).
5“Balance sheet channel” includes “maturity mismatch risk,” “currency mismatch risk,” “capital strc-
ture mismatch risk,” etc. The theoretical analysis of “balance sheet channel” can be found in Aghion
et al (2004), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore
(2002), among others.
Several studies emphasize the validity of the balance sheet channel in the Asian economies. Among
others, see Allen et al (2002), Chen et al (2006), Krugman (1999).
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Singapore. Existing studies on the Singaporean macro-economy typically ignore real
estate market and existing studies on the Singaporean real estate market tend to take a
micro-approach.6 As a result, the dynamic interactions between the real estate market and
the aggregate economy are under-explored. This paper joins this emerging literature by
taking a macro-econometric approach. In particular, it takes a regime-switching structural
vector-regressive (RS-SVAR) approach. Our choice of econometric modeling reflects our
vision on how U.S. and other external factors and the Singapore macroeconomy may have
complicated interactions within the Singaporean housing market. Figure 1 provides an
oversight of that vision. First, the U.S. factors are expected to aﬀect the Singaporean
macro-economy, as confirmed by several previous studies. The macro-economic variables
may have some complicated interactions among themselves. They will then aﬀect the
housing market. This is the indirect channel. The direct channel would clearly be the
U.S. factors directly aﬀecting the Singaporean housing market.
To implement these complicated interactions, this paper will take a two-stage ap-
proach. The first stage is to estimate how the U.S. factors and the world oil price aﬀect
the Singaporean macro-economy. The second stage is to estimate how the Singaporean
macro-economy and other external factors aﬀect housing returns in Singapore. We will
provide more details in the next section.
(Figure 1 about here)
It should be noted that our empirical approach is in line with recent studies of the
housing market and financial markets. First, the regime-switching nature of our econo-
metric model is clearly inspired by a series of papers, including those of Amisano and
Tristani (2009), Chen and Leung (2008), Maheu and McCurdy (2000), Sargent, Williams
and Zha (2006). Sims and Zha (2006), among others. As we do not know a priori which
part of the model will displace regime-switching, we consider several specifications and
examine their performance. Our choice of using the VAR approach is motivated by the
6It is beyond the scope of this paper to review that literature. Among others, see Ong (2008).
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fact that the reduced form of a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE)
can typically be represented by a VAR model,7. Third, there is increasing evidence of
non-trivial dynamics among the macroeconomic variables, real estate variables and fi-
nancial variables.8 Our empirical model thus includes both macroeconomic variables and
financial variables and studies how they aﬀect the housing market.
Our paper also complements a recent study by Hwang and Lum (2009) (HL here-
after). HL extends the GMM approach advocated by Hansen (1982), and estimates the
codependent dynamics of housing and stock market returns in Singapore. As the GMM
approach begins with the dynamic optimization of a representative agent, it enables HL
to provide a nice structural interpretation of the parameters. This paper, in contrast,
takes a structural VAR approach, interpreting that as the reduced form dynamics of a
DSGE model. In particular, the regime-switching approach of this paper allows for the
possibility of a regime-dependent response of housing returns to the stock market return
and other macroeconomic variables, which is confirmed in our estimation. The approach
of this paper also allows us to separate the direct impact from the impact of U.S. factors
on the Singaporean housing market, and from their indirect counterparts that translate
through the Singaporean macro-economy. Clearly, the two papers have very diﬀerent foci
and should be interpreted as complementary.
The structure of this paper is simple. The next section explains in detail the estimation
strategies and the empirical models, and is followed by a section that describes the data.
The results are then presented. The final section concludes the paper.
7Among others, King, Plosser and Rebelo (2002), Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004), Smets and
Wouters,(2007) show that the reduced form of a DSGE model can be approximated by VAR models in
general . With additional assumptions, Kan et al (2004), Leung (2007) show that the reduced form of a
DSGE model with asset markets can be exactly represented by a VAR.
8Among others, see Chang, Chen and Leung (2010a, b), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007), Davis
(2010), Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), Jaccard (2009), Leung (2004), Sims (1980a, b), Tsatsaronis and
Zhu (2004) and Yosihda (2008).
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2 Estimation Strategies and the Empirical Models
2.1 Stage One: Extracting Economic Aggregates Free from For-
eign Eﬀects
Our empirical investigation has two stages. As we want to separate the influence of
external and internal factors on the Singaporean housing market, our first task is to
extract the movements of Singaporean aggregate variables net of the eﬀects from the U.S.
and the rest of the world. Specifically, we obtain the residuals f by estimating the
following  () model:
 = 0 +
X
=1
1− +
X
=1
2− + f    = 1 2 3 (1)
where  = [1 2 3 4]0 is the vector of Singapore’s growth rate of real GDP, real
stock return, growth rate of real amount of trade, and growth rate of nominal exchange
rate;  = [1  2  3  4  5 ]0 is the vector of the U.S. growth rate of real GDP, real
stock return, federal funds rate (FFR), the external finance premium (EFP), and the
TED spread;  represents the eﬀects from the rest of the world: change rate of oil price;f is the vector of residuals; and 0 is a 4× 1 vector, 1 is a 4× 5 vector, and 2 is a
4× 1 vector:
0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
01
02
03
04
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
 1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
111 112 113 114 115
121 122 123 124 125
131 132 133 134 135
141 142 143 144 145
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
 2 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
211 212
221 222
231 232
241 242
21
22
23
24
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

According to Chang, Chen and Leung (2010b), this set of U.S. variables performs well
in predicting the joint dynamics of the U.S. housing and stock returns. Limited by data
availability, we can only allow the length of lag in  and  to be  = 3. Note that
the resulting measure of Singapore’s economic aggregates, f  should be orthogonal to
− and −. We can then proceed to stage two.
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2.2 Stage Two: The Dynamics of Singapore’s Housing Returns
In stage two, we estimate how housing returns are influenced by the domestic aggregate
variables (f ) the U.S. factors ( ), the oil price ( ), and its own lag (−,  = 1 2 )
Specifically, we estimate the following dynamic equation,
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 () + 3 () + X
=1
 ()− +  (2)
where  ∼ (0 2), 01 () is a 1× 4 vector, and 02 () is a 1× 4 vector. The Markov
switching process relates the probability that regime  prevails in  to the prevailing regime
 in  − 1, ( =  | −1 = ) = . The transition probabilities are assumed to be
fixed and the transition matrix of the Singaporean economy is given by:
 =
⎛
⎜⎝
11 1− 22
1− 11 22
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝
exp(1)
1+exp(1)
1
1+exp(2)
1
1+exp(1)
exp(2)
1+exp(2)
⎞
⎟⎠ 
where 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated.
As the state of the economy is unobservable, we identify the regime for given a time
period by the Hamilton (1994) smoothed probability approach, in which the probability
of being state  at time  is given by  ( | Ω ). Given that we assume the state of
nature shifts between two regimes in both economies, i.e.,  ∈  = {1 2}, we identify
the economy most likely to be in state  if  ( =  | Ω )  05,  = 1 2.
A merit of the regime-switching model is that within each regime the model is linear,
which is consistent with the evidence of short-run predictability. On the other hand, the
stochastic switching among regimes would make long-run profitability diﬃcult, which is
consistent with the evidence of (long-run) market eﬃciency.9 Another merit of the model
is that the volatility of shocks, the “responsiveness” of the system to the shocks, the
persistence of variables, among others, can be time-varying. Thus, the regime-switching
model does allow for a more flexible structure. In this paper, we take a further step by
allowing various combinations of coeﬃcients of the regime-switching model to be regime-
dependent. Depending on whether a coeﬃcient or a group of coeﬃcients are subject to
regime switching, we consider a total of nine specifications of models, labeled Model 1 to
9Among others, see Chang, Chen and Leung (2010a) for more discussion on this point.
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Model 9, as listed in the appendix. Model 1 is a single-regime model:
 = 0 +01f +02 + 3 + X
=1
− +  (3)
in which all coeﬃcients are constants. On the other hand, the model (2), labeled as Model
9, is the most general specification, in which all coeﬃcients are regime-dependent.
2.3 Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on Singaporean and the U.S. data covering
the period 19841 − 20102 the longest time series for both countries accessible to
the authors. To be compatible with the house price index that is available quarterly,
variables that were originally available monthly are transformed into quarterly variables.
The definitions and sources of data are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
The data from Singapore were taken from the Singaporean Department of Statistics.
The amount of trade is defined as the sum of total exports and imports. There is a major
residential property price index and other five sub-indices available. As shown in Figure
2a and Table 2, they exhibit the same pattern of dynamics and their pairwise correlations
are extremely high. In the following, we use the aggregate residential property price index
(HP 1) as our measure of Singapore’s housing price index. Real GDP, real stock index,
and real amount of trade are deflated by CPI. We compute stock and housing returns by
taking the growth rates of the stock price index and housing price index respectively.
[Figure 2a, Table 2 about here]
For the U.S. data, real GDP was taken from the Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis. The federal funds rate was taken from H.15 statistical release
(“Selected Interest Rates”) issued by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The S&P
500 stock price index is obtained from DataStream. There are a number of available
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series that have been used as the measure external finance premium. Here we choose
corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa) as our measure of the external finance premium. The
TED spread is the diﬀerence between the interest rate for three-month U.S. T-bills and
the three-month Eurodollars contract, represented by the London Interbank Oﬀering Rate
(LIBOR).10 Both the corporate bond spread and the 3-month Eurodollar deposit rate are
from the H.15 statistical release (“Selected Interest Rates”) issued by the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors.
Figure 2 and 3 plot the economic aggregates for Singapore, the U.S., and the rest of
the world. Table 3 gives a statistical description of Singapore’s housing returns, which
shows that the volatility of housing returns is extremely large. With a mean growth rate
of 3916%, it oscillates between the maximum and the minimum (35143%, −40194%)
during its sample periods.
[Table 2b, 3; Figure 2-3 about here]
3 Baseline Results
We first extract residuals of Singapore’s economic aggregates by estimating the model (1),
and then proceed to estimate the dynamics of Singapore’s housing returns from Model 1
to Model 9.
The estimation results of the model (1) are listed in Table A-1 of the appendix. We
then plot the residuals from the estimation, i.e., Singapore’s GDP, stock return, total
amount of trade, and the nominal exchange rate after controlling for the eﬀects of the
U.S. and the rest of the world, in the dotted lines of Figure 2.
10The widely-used BBA LIBOR, compiled by the British Bankers’ Association, started only from
January 1986. Therefore, we replace the 3-month LIBOR rate by 3-month Eurodollar deposit rate.
These two series are highly correlated.
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3.1 Determinants of the Dynamics of Housing Returns
The residuals from estimating the model (1) are plugged into the Singapore’s housing
return equation. We then estimate Model 1 to 9. The estimation results are shown in
Table A-2 of the appendix .
The regime-dependent means of housing returns for Models 2 to 9 are listed in Table
4. Clearly, the mean of housing returns in regime 2 is much lower than that of regime 1
for all models. In fact, in six out of eight regime-switching models the mean returns are
negative. Hence, we label regime 2 as the bust regime and regime 1 as the boom regime.
The transition probabilities for Models 2 and 9, as shown in Table 5, vary widely across
models.
Given the estimated parameters, transition probabilities, and variance-covariance ma-
trix, we compute the smoothed probabilities of the bust regime for Models 2 to 9, as
shown in Figure 4 and Table 6. With diﬀerent model specifications, the identified bust
periods are very much diﬀerent across models. In particular, in Models 8 and 9, where
almost all parameters are assumed to be subject to regime switching, the shifts of regimes
are very frequent. It is evident from Table 5 that the transition probabilities of these two
models are much lower than others. From these results, we gain a glimpse of possible
errors if a model is mis-specified.
[Table 4-6]
[Figure 4]
How do we choose a winner from among these nine models? A criterion is to compare
the performances of their in-sample forecasts. We compute two widely-used measures
for forecasting housing returns  : mean square errors () and mean absolute errors
(), which are defined respectively as
() = 1 − 
−X
=1
³+ − b+|´2 
() = 1 − 
−X
=1
¯¯¯+ − b+| ¯¯¯ 
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where b+| ≡  ³+ | Ω´. Clearly, MSE tends to penalize “big mistakes” more than
the MAE. As will be clear, our main conclusions do not depend on whether MSE or MAE
is used.
We compute both the MSE and MAE of in-sample -step ahead forecasts,  = 1  4,
across all models, and the results are displayed in Table 9. Several interesting observations
are in order. First, we find that, regardless of whetherMSE orMAE are used, Model 5 has
the best in-sample forecasting performance among these eight regime-switching models,
followed by Model 6. Specifically, Model 5 is specified as
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 () + 3 + X
=1
− +  (4)
i.e., only the intercepts and coeﬃcients of Singapore’s “net” economic aggregates and of
the U.S. macroeconomic variables are regime-dependent. Figure 5 plots the movements
of housing returns in Singapore and its predicted values under Model 5. We can see that
Model 5 is able to capture the dynamics of the housing returns closely.
Second, most regime-switching models have higher MSE and MAE than the linear
model (Model 1). This suggests that taking account of regime switching may yield worse
results than a linear model if the model is mis-specified.
[Table 9]
[Figure 5]
Given that Model 5 has the best in-sample forecasting, Table 10 displays its estimation
results. There are several notable findings. First, Singapore’s GDP has a significantly
negative eﬀect on its housing return in the boom regime, while the GDP of U.S. has a
positive eﬀect on Singapore’s housing return in boom regime and a negative eﬀect in bust
regime.11 To understand this result, we first plot the movements of the housing returns
11Notice that our econometric model is a two-stage procedure. As it is shown in Wooldrige (2010),
Chong, Lam and Yan (2011), Chong and Yan (2011), among others, the standard error tends to be larger
than the OLS counterparts. Thus, while our model yields unbiased estimates of the coeﬃcients, we tend
to under-evaluate the statistical significance of those coeﬃcients. Since correcting for the standard error
estimation is very diﬃcult in a regime-switching structural VAR context, and the coeﬃcients that we
identify as statistically significant would only improve should the correction is made, we only acknowledge
this issue and proceed.
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of both countries in Figure 6. Note that the dynamics of Singapore’s housing returns are
much more volatile than those of the U.S., and the patterns of housing return movements
are also very diﬀerent in the two economies. For example, in the last ten years Singapore’s
housing returns rose to almost 30% and did not decline until late 2007. The decline in
housing returns following the subprime crisis was very deep, but starting in early 2009
the housing market rebounded at an astonishing pace, while the U.S. housing market was
still staggering.
That a positive shock can lead to a negative response in the housing return may sound
counter-intuitive, but we attempt to provide an explanation here. A good shock of GDP
growth at time  leads to an immediate appreciation of house prices, as the housing supply
is fixed in the short run. Over time, however, the supply can respond. It may be even
more pronounced in Singapore as the Singaporean government is often pro-active. Thus,
as the shock dies down, the future increase in house price will not be as much. Therefore,
the time  increase in house price could be larger than those in subsequent periods, leading
to time  housing returns () being higher than time  + 1 returns ( + 1). Moreover,
according to the regime-classification provided by our regime-switching model, when the
Singapore’s housing returns are in the boom regime, the U.S. housing market stays in the
bust regime. This is consistent with the notion that U.S. investors tend to diversify their
portfolios internationally.12
Second, stock market fluctuations in Singapore will aﬀect the housing market, but
only in the bust regime. This indicates that the spillover eﬀect of the financial market
strengthens in a bear market. Third, a rise in the total amount of trade and an apprecia-
tion in exchange rate leads to higher housing returns. This is intuitive because Singapore
has been running trade surpluses, and larger trade surpluses lead to an appreciation in
the exchange rate. These two eﬀects together bring in more foreign capital, leading to
domestic asset prices rises.
Fourth, more importantly, U.S. monetary policy and the EFP both have significantly
negative eﬀects on Singapore’s housing returns. This indicates that the international
transmission channels of Singapore’s housing returns work through the monetary policy
12Among others, see Curcuru et al (2010) for more discussion on this.
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and risk premium of the U.S., especially in the boom regime. Finally, the U.S. stock
market and the oil price do not have significant eﬀects on Singapore’s housing market.
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the Singapore housing returns to innovation in
equation (2) across diﬀerent models. Interestingly, they all show a large initial response
that diminishes almost completely within two years.
[Table 10 about here]
[Figure 6, 7 about here]
3.2 Diebold and Mariano Test
On top of the MAE and MSE statistics, we can also directly measure whether one model
predicts statistically significantly better than an alternative. Following the literature, we
adopt the Diebold-Mariano test to assess the “relative performance” of diﬀerent models.13
Let {} denote the series to be forecast and let +| be the model 0s -step forecast of
+ based on the information at time    0,  = 1 2. Let +| be the model  forecast
error, +| ≡ + − +| The Diebold-Mariano (henceforth DM) test is based on the
loss diﬀerential,
 = 
³1+|´−  ³2+|´ 
where (·) is a loss function. Clearly, if the two models have roughly the same predictive
power, the expectation of the loss diﬀerential will be zero,  [] = 0 If, instead, Model 1
predicts better (worse) model 2, the expected value of the loss diﬀerential will be positive
(negative).14 The results are not very satisfactory. Model 5 statistically out-performs
13The Diebold and Mariano test has been widely used in the literature. See Hordahl, Tristani and
Vestin (2006) for a review of the literature.
14The DM statistics will depend  which is an average value of  for diﬀerent period , and the
co-variance of  and −  = 1 2 3  As shown by Zivot (2004), other things being equal, if model
1 which consistently over-predict in some sub-period and then consistently under-predict in other sub-
period, it is more likely to get not only a lower value of  in diﬀerent period t, but also a higher value
of co-variance  and −   = 1 2 3  As a result, model 1 is would be classified as under-perform the
alternative model. See Zivot (2004) for more details.
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Models 9 and 10, but not the others. One possible explanation is that the time series
is relatively short. Data availability constrains us from considering a more sophisticated
model.
[Table 11 about here]
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Single Stage Estimation
As a direct comparison with Model 5, we estimate it again using Singapore’s economic
aggregates without controlling for foreign eﬀects. That is, we estimate the following Model
5A:
 = 0 () +01 () +02 () + 3 +
X
=1
− +  (5)
Note that the diﬀerence between this model and Model 5 is that the term f in (4) is now
replaced by  which is the vector of Singapore’s economic aggregates that contain noises
from the U.S. and the rest of the world. By doing so, we forego the stage one estimation
and proceed to Stage two directly.
Table 12 and 13 summarize the statistical properties of Model 5A, together with Model
5. Table 14 and Figure 8 clearly shows that, without accounting for noises from the U.S.
and the rest of the world, the regimes identified according to the Markov process switch
much more frequently.
Table 15 shows that Model 5A performs marginally better than Model 5 in terms of
MSE, but Model 5A performs far worse than Model 5 in terms of MAE.
Table 16 compares the estimation results of these two models. Distinct features are
evident in accounting for the dynamic properties of Singapore’s housing returns between
these two models. Importantly, this shows exactly why our two-stage approach matters.
For example, the U.S. stock price and the oil price do not aﬀect Singapore’s housing
returns after accounting for the interactions of macroeconomic variables between Singa-
pore, the U.S., and the rest of the world (Model 5). However, the U.S. stock price and
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the oil price appear to have significant eﬀects on those housing returns under Model 5A.
In other words, the U.S. stock price and the oil price in the world market only aﬀect the
Singaporean housing market by aﬀecting the domestic aggregate variables, an indirect
eﬀect. The drawback of a single stage approach such as Model 5A is that it does not help
the reader to separate direct and indirect eﬀects. In contrast, our two-stage approach is
able to disentangle the complicated interaction eﬀects and clearly identify the sources of
fluctuation in Singapore’s housing returns.
[Table 12-16 about here]
4.2 An Alternative Modeling Strategy
In this subsection, we estimate an alternative model that makes two important changes to
the benchmark model. First, in the benchmark model, we include only four of Singapore’s
macroeconomic variables in the stage one estimation, i.e.,  = [1 2 3 4]0 includes
the growth rate of real GDP, real stock return, growth rate of real amount of trade, and
growth rate of nominal exchange rate. We now expand the set of variables by including
a fifth element, Singapore’s housing returns, so that  = [1 2 3 4 5]0 is a 5 ×
1 vector. We obtain the residuals f from the estimation. Second, in the stage two
estimation, we consider the following model
f = 0 () + X
=1
0 () f− +  (6)
where  () is a 5 × 5 matrix. As compared to (4), the stage two estimation includes
no macroeconomic variables of the U.S. and the rest of the world.
We label this specification the “Alternative Model.” There are two objectives in spec-
ifying this model. First, by adding housing returns to the stage one estimation, we allow
them to interact with other macroeconomic variables, which will in turn have an impact
on the residuals in f . Second, in stage two, we include only the lagged terms of f , as
the eﬀects of the U.S. and the rest of world have been filtered in stage one. Clearly, a
drawback of this model is that the results obtained here are not directly comparable to
the previous results. Previously, our stage two model maximized the matching between
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the model and the raw housing return data. Under the Alternative Model, stage two (6)
attempts to maximize the matching between the model and the “filtered data,” not only
the housing return, but the whole vector of the filtered data (i.e. including the Singa-
porean GDP growth rate, stock return, etc.). Nonetheless, some of our colleagues insist
us to estimate the Alternative Model because it may be statistically more general.
Table 12 and 13 compare the statistical properties of the Alternative Model to the other
models. Table 15 compares the MSE and MAE between Model 5 and this Alternative
Model. Clearly, Model 5 performs better than the Alternative Model based on either one
of the criteria. Again, it should be recalled that the Alternative Model needs to balance
the matching between the model and a whole vector of the Singaporean variables, while
Model 5 focuses on matching the data of housing return only. For completeness, Table 17
lists the stage two estimation results for housing returns.
[Table 17 about here]
5 Concluding Remarks
Given the increasing interdependence of economies in recent decades, the potential signif-
icance of the international transmission of fluctuations in economic activity and financial
markets has gained attention. In many Asian countries, it is a very important concern
for both academics and policy makers. On the one hand, most Asian countries are still
developing, and openness to international trade and capital flows can be vital to contin-
ued economic growth. On the other hand, international exposure in trade and financial
services may imply higher volatility in economic growth, and even social conflict in some
cases.15
Tselichtchev and Debroux (2009, pp.189-192) summarize the Singaporean experience
as follows,
15Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review that literature. Among others, see Acemoglu
et al (2003), Imbs (2004), Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
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“On the financial front, heavy investment, by both foreign and local capital, in prop-
erty and stock in the first half of the decade led to a surge of asset prices, resulting in
a financial bubble. Stock and property prices peaked in 1996 and had begun to decline
before the Asian crisis... Generally, the influence of the Asian crisis on the national econ-
omy was marginal. Still, in 1998, GDP fell by 14 percent and stock prices plunged by
over 60 percent from their peak.... In 2008, in the wake of the global financial turmoil,
the Singapore economy slowed down, first and foremost because of a slump in exports....
In the fourth quarter it shrank dramatically 170 percent on a quarter-to-quarter and
37 percent on a year-to-year basis. The growth rate for the whole of 2008 was only 12
percent. Signs of deflation appeared. The key Straits Times Index (STI) fell almost 55
percent between the beginning of the year and the end of October....”
This quotation highlights a few facts. First, Singapore has experienced financial crises
and its economy is still growing. Second, while GDP can fall a few percentage points on
an annual basis during a crisis, the stock price can lose half of its value. As other au-
thors have studied the dynamics between the Singaporean economy and its stock market,
this paper focuses on Singapore’s housing market dynamics. We investigate how external
shocks (for instance, from the U.S.) as well as internally generated shocks are transmitted
to the housing market. Our principal finding that the responses of housing returns signifi-
cantly diﬀer across regimes is important. From the best model we can identify (Model 5),
we find that during the boom regime, the housing return responds negatively to the GDP
growth rate and the exchange rate fluctuations in Singapore dollars, and to the Federal
Fund rate and the External Finance Premium of the U.S. Perhaps more interestingly,
the responses of Singaporean housing returns to these factors are not statistically signif-
icant during the bust regime. One interpretation is that during the boom regime, these
factors will stimulate the current period housing price more than the subsequent period
price, which will tend to depress returns. Why would the housing price of the current
period respond diﬀerently to those factors from the subsequent periods during the boom
regime? One possible explanation is that during the current period, the supply is fixed
and the current period price tends to respond sharply. Yet the same sharp increase in
price also stimulates the housing supply in subsequent periods, which tends to suppress
future price growth. The question is then why this mechanism fails to operate during
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the bust regime. One explanation is that during the bust regime, both households and
developers are very cautious, or process information very diﬀerently, which may aﬀect
the equilibrium responses in house price and the housing supply. If this is indeed the
case, this paper provides indirect support to theories that emphasize diﬀerent attitudes
of households and firms across regimes. Those diﬀerences can be caused by financial
constraints, beliefs, behavioral factors, allocation of attention or other factors.16 Future
research should explore how to identify the reasons behind the diﬀerent responses.
An alternative explanation is that the government behaves very diﬀerently across
regimes. However, this is not easy to verify in the current framework. In fact, this
paper takes a somewhat reduced-form approach. Limited by the data availability and
the sample size, we can only estimate the overall response of the Singaporean economy
to diﬀerent shocks. We cannot separate the response of the private sector from that
of the government sector. According to Tselichtchev and Debroux (2009, pp.192-195),
government intervention can be a significant component:
“The government’s $205 billion Resilience Package for 2009 consists of five com-
ponents: job creation; stimulation of bank lending (the government is to extend capital
to share risks with banks); enhance business cash-flow and competitiveness (through tax
measures and grants); supporting families; and building a home for the future (infrastruc-
ture spending and expanded provisions for education and healthcare).... For Singapore,
city-making has a special meaning. It is not just about solving the problems of a big city
or addressing the challenges it faces. It is an “aggressive” policy of making it...”
Future research should take a more “structural approach” to separately identifying the
response from the private sector versus the public sector. That will enable us to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent government policies, which could lead to very important
research results for both policy makers and academic researchers in Asia.
16It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this emerging literature, among others, see Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2010), Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), and the reference therein.
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Figure 1: How the USA factors and the Singapore macro‐economy may affect the 
Singapore housing market 
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Figure 2a  House Price Indices in Singapore (See Table 2 for Definitions) 
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Figure 2b Economic Aggregates of Singapore Before and After Extracting the Effects 
from the Rest of the World 
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Note: “GDP” refers to GDP growth. “S” refers to the stock returns. “Trade” refers to 
growth rate of real amount of international trade. “Ex-R” refers to growth rate of 
exchange rate. “X-tutta” refers to the X variable after controlling for US and world 
variables. 
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Figure 3 Variables of the U.S. and the Rest of the World 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
GDP
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
S
0
2
4
6
8
10
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
FFR
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
EFP
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
TED
-100
-50
0
50
100
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Oil
 
Note: “GDP” refers to GDP growth. “S” refers to the stock returns. “FFR” refers to 
federal fund rate. “EFP” refers to the external finance premium. “TED” refers to TED 
spread. “Oil” refers to oil price change. 
 
Figure 4 Smoothed Probabilities of Regime 2 (Bust Regime) 
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Figure 5 Singapore’s Housing Returns and the Predicted Housing Returns by Model 5 
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Figure 6 The Housing Returns of Singapore and the U.S. 
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Figure 7 Impulse Response of Housing Return to a Standard Deviation of Innovation 
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Figure 8 Smoothed Probabilities of Regime 2 for Model 5 and 5A 
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Figure 9  The Data for the Filtered Housing Returns and the 
Forecasting Returns 
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Table 1 Definitions and Sources of Data (1984Q1-2010Q2) 
 Variables Definition 
Singapore Housing price index The Aggregate Residential Property Price Index 
 GDP SP GDP AT MARKET PRICES CURA (SP$, 
seasonally adjusted) 
 Stock price index MSCI SINGAPORE-PRICE INDEX (SP$) 
 CPI SP CPI NADJ (SP$) 
 Exchange rate SP SINGAPORE DOLLARS TO US $ 
 Import SP IMPORTS CURA (SP$) 
 Export SP EXPORTS CURA (SP$) 
U.S. GDP Real Gross Domestic Product (seasonally adjusted) 
 Stock price index S&P500 index 
 FFR Federal funds rate 
 EFP External finance premium: corporate bond spread 
(Baa-Aaa) 
 TED spread 3-month Eurodollar deposit rate - 3-month T-bill rate 
World Oil price OPEC Oil Basket Price U$/Bbl 
Note:  The Singapore data are taken form Singapore Department of Statistics, and the U.S. data 
are respectively from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and 
DataStream. 
 
Table 2 Correlation coefficient Among Six Property Price Indices 
 HP_1 HP_2 HP_3 HP_4 HP_5 HP_6 
HP_1 1.000 0.978 0.987 0.985 0.993 0.990 
HP_2  1.000 0.991 0.993 0.954 0.942 
HP_3   1.000 0.995 0.965 0.962 
HP_4    1.000 0.965 0.955 
HP_5     1.000 0.991 
HP_6      1.000 
Note: The six property price indices are respectively HP_1: Aggregate residential property price 
index, HP_2: Median Housing price (landed; detached, SGD/ sq m), HP_3: Median Housing price 
(landed; semi-detached, SGD/ sq m), HP_4: Median Housing price (landed; terrace, SGD/ sq m), 
HP_5: Median Housing price (non-landed; apartment, SGD/ sq m), HP_6: Median Housing price 
(non-landed; condominium, SGD/ sq m). 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of Singapore’s Housing Return (%) 
Mean 3.196 
Median 4.629 
Maximum 35.143 
Minimum -40.194 
Std. Dev. 15.846 
Skewness -0.284 
Kourtosis 2.835 
Jarque-Bera 1.160 
[0.560] 
        Note: Value in square brackets is P-value 
 
Table 4  Regime-Dependent Mean of Housing Returns (%) 
Model Regime 1 Regime 2 
1 3.610 3.610 
2 8.365 -22.782 
3 17.473 -7.804 
4 9.173 -19.499 
5 7.453 0.487 
6 15.182 -15.761 
7 9.160 1.646 
8 10.752 -0.458 
9 12.147 -0.766 
 
Table 5 Transition probabilities for Model 2 to Model 9 
Model 11P  22P  
2 0.953 0.759 
3 0.780 0.777 
4 0.948 0.791 
5 0.900 0.906 
6 0.939 0.912 
7 0.920 0.869 
8 0.715 0.694 
9 0.483 0.664 
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Table 6 Periods of Identified as Regime 2 (Bust Regime) 
Model Bust Periods 
2 1984Q4  1986Q2  1997Q2-1998Q4  2003Q3-2004Q4 
3 1986Q2  1987Q3-1988Q1  1989Q4-1991Q3  1992Q2  1993Q1  
1995Q1-1996Q1  1996Q3-1998Q4  2000Q1-2000Q3 
2001Q3-2006Q2  2008Q2-2008Q3 
4 1984Q4  1986Q2  1996Q4-1998Q4  2003Q3-2005Q1 
5 1985Q1-1985Q3  1987Q3-1992Q2  1997Q3-1998Q4  
2002Q1-2008Q4 
6 1984Q4  1996Q3-1998Q4  2000Q1-2006Q1  2008Q2-2009Q2 
7 1984Q4-1986Q2  1996Q3-1998Q4  2003Q1-2005Q3  
2009Q3-2010Q2 
8 1985Q2-1985Q3  1986Q2  1987Q4-1989Q3  1990Q1-1990Q3  
1992Q2  1993Q1  1995Q2-1995Q3  1996Q1  1997Q1-1998Q4  
1999Q3-1999Q4  2002Q1-2005Q1  2006Q2-2008Q3  
9 1985Q2-1985Q3  1986Q2  1986Q4-1987Q1  1987Q4  1988Q3  
1989Q1-1989Q3  1990Q1-1991Q2  1992Q2  1993Q1  1993Q4  
1995Q2-1995Q3  1996Q1  1996Q3-1998Q4  1999Q2  1999Q4  
2000Q4-2001Q3  2002Q3-2008Q4  2009Q4  2010Q2 
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Table 7 The Summary Statistics of Housing Returns (%): Data and Models (1984Q4-2010Q2) 
Correl. Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Mean 3.196 3.196 3.136 3.349 3.120 3.184 2.962 3.392 3.540 3.610 
Median 4.629 4.199 5.181 4.714 4.753 4.468 4.273 4.908 5.232 4.397 
Maximun 35.143 33.226 30.287 32.577 31.006 33.298 32.994 30.984 32.231 33.085 
Minimun -40.194 -36.099 -37.243 -36.548 -37.529 -36.772 -38.380 -40.228 -33.961 -33.632 
Std. Dev. 15.846 15.354 15.322 15.579 15.493 15.381 15.938 15.664 15.056 15.212 
Skewness -0.284 -0.391 -0.458 -0.354 -0.447 -0.382 -0.429 -0.483 -0.365 -0.308 
Kurtosis 2.835 2.854 2.971 2.751 2.925 2.998 2.849 2.982 2.801 2.702 
 
 
Table 8 Correlation Between Housing Returns and Other Macroeconomic Variables 
Correl. Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
(H,GDP) 0.679 0.683 0.682 0.695 0.673 0.670 0.664 0.677 0.686 0.673 
(H,S) 0.576 0.563 0.560 0.553 0.558 0.542 0.526 0.543 0.543 0.565 
(H,Trade) 0.566 0.582 0.579 0.609 0.568 0.577 0.580 0.570 0.596 0.574 
(H,EX-R) -0.626 -0.614 -0.612 -0.616 -0.611 -0.612 -0.611 -0.622 -0.618 -0.602 
Key: “Correl” refers to Correlation; “(H,GDP)” refers to (House Return, GDP growth); “(H,S)” refers to (House Return, Stock Price Change); 
“(H,Trade)” refers to (House Return, Real Amount of International growth rate); “(H,EX-R)” refers to (House Return, Exchange Rate 
Change) 
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Table 9  In-Sample Forecasting Performance 
Model MSE MAE 
1 15.203 3.076 
2 15.942 3.137 
3 15.381 3.091 
4 17.306 3.173 
5 14.625 2.793 
6 14.777 2.965 
7 15.134 2.945 
8 16.226 3.151 
9 18.837 3.544 
 
Table 10 The Estimation results of Model 5 
 Regime 1 (boom regime) Regime 2 (bust regime) 
GDP growth rate (Singapore) -0.606** 0.323 
Stock return (Singapore) 0.014 0.162*** 
Change rate of amount of Trade (Singapore) 0.581*** -0.139 
Change rate of exchange rate (Singapore) -0.481** 0.115 
GDP growth rate (US) 0.960* -0.883** 
Stock return (US) 0.036 -0.084 
FFR(US) -2.313*** 0.005 
EFP(US) -4.601** -5.854 
TED 1.737 1.140 
Oil price growth rate -0.011  
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
Table 11 A Summary of Diebold and Mariano (1995) Statistics 
Model MSE MAE 
1 -0.252 -1.446 
2 -0.442 -1.509 
3 -0.254 -1.149 
4 -0.739 -1.545 
5 benchmark benchmark 
6 -0.049 -0.747 
7 -0.161 -0.628 
8 -0.642  -1.793* 
9  -1.660*    -3.341*** 
           Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. * Statistically significant at 10% level. 
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Table 12 The Summary Statistics of Housing Returns (%): Data, Model 5, 5A, and the Alternative 
Model (1984Q4-2010Q2) [Charles: is Filtered Data out of place] 
Correl. Data Model 5 Model 5A Filtered Data Alternative Model 
Mean 3.196 3.184 3.294 0.000 0.183 
Median 4.629 4.468 4.630 -0.297 1.420 
Maximun 35.143 33.298 31.853 27.946 20.759 
Minimun -40.194 -36.772 -35.437 -47.087 -39.848 
Std. Dev. 15.846 15.381 15.375 12.593 10.547 
Skewness -0.284 -0.382 -0.332 -0.523 -0.922 
Kurtosis 2.835 2.998 2.828 4.631 5.054 
Key: Notice that the Alternative model tries to match the “filtered data” and the other models in the 
text attempt to match the raw data. Hence they are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, we put 
the corresponding figures together in a table for reference. 
 
Table 13 Correlation Between Housing Returns and Other Macroeconomic Variables 
Correl. Data Model 5 Model 5A Filtered Data Alternative Model 
(H,GDP) 0.679 0.670 0.697 0.670 0.564 
(H,S) 0.576 0.542 0.570 0.621 0.504 
(H,Trade) 0.566 0.577 0.576 0.529 0.394 
(H,EX-R) -0.626 -0.612 -0.598 -0.558 -0.499 
Key: “Correl” refers to Correlation; “(H,GDP)” refers to (House Return, GDP growth); “(H,S)” 
refers to (House Return, Stock Price Change); “(H,Trade)” refers to (House Return, Real 
Amount of International growth rate); “(H,EX-R)” refers to (House Return, Exchange Rate 
Change). For the alternative specification, we report the correlation between filtered housing 
returns and other filtered macroeconomic variables. For the alternative model, we calculate the 
correlations between Filtered housing returns and other filtered macroeconomic variables. 
   
Table 14  Periods of being in State 2 for Model 5, 5A, and the Alternative Model 
Model Bust Periods 
5 1985Q1-1985Q3  1987Q3-1992Q2  1997Q3-1998Q4  
2002Q1-2008Q4 
5A 1984Q4  1986Q2  1987Q1  1987Q3-1987Q4  1989Q4   
1990Q3-1991Q3  1992Q2  1993Q1  1993Q4  1995Q2-1995Q3  
1996Q1  1996Q3-1998Q4  2000Q1-2000Q3  2001Q3  
2002Q3-2007Q3  2008Q2-2008Q3  2009Q3-2009Q4 
Alternative 
Model 
1984Q2  1985Q2-1986Q1  1996Q2-1999Q1  2001Q3-2001Q4  
2002Q3-2002Q4  2008Q4  2010Q2 
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Table 15  In-Sample Forecasting Performance: Model 5,5A, and the Alternative Model 
Model MSE MAE 
5 14.625 2.793 
5A 14.540 3.064 
Alternative 43.212 5.348 
 
 
Table 16 The Estimation Results of Model 5 and 5A 
 Model 5 Nodel 5A 
 Regime 1 
(boom regime) 
Regime 2 
(bust regime) 
Regime 1 
(boom regime) 
Regime 2 
(bust regime) 
GDP growth rate 
(Singapore) 
-0.606** 0.323 0.071 0.131 
Stock return (Singapore) 0.014 0.162*** 0.115*** 0.167*** 
Change rate of amount 
of Trade (Singapore) 
0.581*** -0.139 0.039 -0.005 
Change rate of exchange 
rate (Singapore) 
-0.481** 0.115 -0.024 0.095 
GDP growth rate (US) 0.960* -0.883** 0.253 -1.730*** 
Stock return (US) 0.036 -0.084 0.149*** -0.141*** 
FFR(US) -2.313*** 0.005 -0.981*** -0.237 
EFP(US) -4.601** -5.854 -3.004 -6.417*** 
TED(US) 1.737 1.140 2.624 0.572 
Oil price growth rate -0.011  -0.020*  
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
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Table 17 Stage Two Estimation Results of Housing Return under the Alternative Model 
 Regime 1 (boom regime) Regime 2 (bust regime) 
GDP-tutta (Singapore) -0.012 -0.242 
S-tutta (Singapore) 0.092 0.446 
Trade-tutta (Singapore) -0.162 0.008 
Ex-R-tutta (Singapore) 0.038 -0.264 
H-tutta (Singapore) 0.665*** 0.226 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 18 The Unconditional Means for Filtered Data under the Alternative Model 
 Regime 1 (boom regime) Regime 2 (bust regime) 
GDP-tutta (Singapore) 1.974 -8.464 
S-tutta (Singapore) 7.007 -22.069 
Trade-tutta (Singapore) 4.224 -15.360 
Ex-R-tutta (Singapore) -1.415 2.518 
H-tutta (Singapore) 4.426 -14.856 
 
 
Table 19 A Summary of Diebold and Mariano (1995) Statistics 
Model MSE MAE 
5 benchmark benchmark 
5A 0.035 -1.259 
   
       Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. * Statistically significant at 10% level. 
Key: Notice that the Model 5 is to forecast the future housing return, while Alternative model is to 
forecast the future “filtered” housing return. Thus, a direct comparison of the forecasting ability of 
Model 5A and Alternative is inappropriate. 
 
APPENDIX
A Nine specifications of Models
Model 1
 = 0 +01f +02 + 3 + X
=1
− +  (7)
Model 2
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 + 3 + X
=1
− +  (8)
Model 3
 = 0 () +01f +02 () + 3 + X
=1
− +  (9)
Model 4
 = 0 () +01f +02 + 3 () + X
=1
− +  (10)
Model 5
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 () + 3 + X
=1
− +  (11)
Model 6
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 + 3 () + X
=1
− +  (12)
Model 7
 = 0 () +01f +02 () + 3 () + X
=1
− +  (13)
Model 8
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 () + 3 () + X
=1
− +  (14)
Model 9
 = 0 () +01 () f +02 () + 3 () + X
=1
 ()− +  (15)
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Appendix B 
This appendix provides details of the regression results discussed in the text. 
Table B‐1  Stage One Estimation for the Benchmark Model 
Parameter  GDP  Stock Return  Amount of Trade  Exchange Rate 
Constant  7.388** 
(2.955) 
14.971 
(13.667) 
1.463 
(5.363) 
‐1.440 
(2.642) 
GDP(‐1)  ‐0.095 
(0.946) 
‐0.540 
(4.377) 
2.214 
(1.718) 
‐0.289 
(0.846) 
Stock(‐1)  0.006 
(0.058) 
0.357 
(0.269) 
‐0.105 
(0.106) 
0.105** 
(0.052) 
FFR(‐1)  3.926*** 
(1.297) 
9.892* 
(5.998) 
3.924* 
(2.353) 
‐2.600** 
(1.160) 
EFP(‐1)  ‐3.241 
(4.027) 
‐11.444 
(18.629) 
‐10.402 
(7.310) 
‐0.537 
(3.602) 
TED(‐1)  ‐2.928 
(2.579) 
‐7.408 
(11.929) 
‐1.449 
(4.681) 
1.638 
(2.306) 
Oil(‐1)  0.006 
(0.022) 
0.020 
(0.101) 
0.081** 
(0.040) 
‐0.031 
(0.019) 
GDP(‐2)  0.822 
(1.380) 
‐7.040 
(6.383) 
1.867 
(2.505) 
‐0.093 
(1.234) 
Stock(‐2)  0.075 
(0.074) 
0.228 
(0.342) 
0.174 
(0.134) 
‐0.024 
(0.066) 
FFR(‐2)  ‐0.218 
(2.189) 
‐6.493 
(10.126) 
‐2.008 
(3.973) 
1.193 
(1.958) 
EFP(‐2)  ‐0.670 
(5.219) 
10.868 
(24.142) 
1.749 
(9.473) 
0.503 
(4.667) 
TED(‐2)  1.443 
(2.603) 
1.117 
(12.041) 
3.798 
(4.725) 
0.590 
(2.328) 
Oil(‐2)  0.010 
(0.028) 
‐0.148 
(0.127) 
0.028 
(0.050) 
‐0.018 
(0.025) 
GDP(‐3)  ‐1.578* 
(0.896) 
6.068 
(4.143) 
‐1.905 
(1.626) 
2.015** 
(0.801) 
Stock(‐3)  ‐0.013 
(0.058) 
‐0.103 
(0.266) 
‐0.111 
(0.104) 
‐0.030 
(0.051) 
FFR(‐3)  ‐3.143** 
(1.330) 
‐4.973 
(6.151) 
‐2.379 
(2.414) 
0.295 
(1.189) 
EFP(‐3)  3.613 
(3.555) 
5.762 
(16.444) 
11.336* 
(6.453) 
‐2.232 
(3.179) 
TED(‐3)  ‐0.101 
(2.254) 
‐3.388 
(10.428) 
‐3.759 
(4.092) 
1.501 
(2.016) 
Oil(‐3)  0.018 
(0.023) 
‐0.196** 
(0.105) 
‐0.012 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.020) 
Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically 
significant at 10% level. Values in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
Table B‐2  Stage Two Estimation for the Benchmark Model
parameter 
Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
State 1  State 2  State1 State 2 State 1  State 2
0b   8.334*** 
(2.199) 
    11.572*** 
(2.018) 
2.258 
(4.299) 
  16.123*** 
(1.980) 
3.104 
(3.405) 
1d   1.339*** 
(0.079) 
  1.190***
(0.074) 
1.050*** 
(0.077) 
 
2d   ‐0.568*** 
(0.080) 
  ‐0.489***
(0.064) 
‐0.272*** 
(0.070) 
 
11b   0.061 
(0.174) 
    0.148 
(0.167) 
0.437 
(0.927) 
  ‐0.080 
(0.141) 
 
12b   0.084*** 
(0.027) 
    0.039* 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.294) 
  0.071*** 
(0.020) 
 
13b   0.100 
(0.078) 
    0.096 
(0.074) 
0.193 
(0.682) 
  0.216*** 
(0.069) 
 
14b   ‐0.144 
(0.124) 
    ‐0.144 
(0.108) 
‐0.156 
(0.524) 
  ‐0.116 
(0.105) 
 
21b   ‐0.685** 
(0.296) 
  ‐0.072
(0.270) 
‐0.751** 
(0.318) 
‐0.292
(0.488) 
22b   0.047 
(0.034) 
  0.112***
(0.029) 
0.246*** 
(0.045) 
‐0.042
(0.035) 
23b   ‐0.347 
(0.213) 
    ‐0.935*** 
(0.205) 
    ‐1.244*** 
(0.275) 
0.244 
(0.327) 
24b   ‐4.627***      ‐6.654***      ‐7.855***  ‐2.480 
(1.796)  (1.803)  (1.779)  (2.509) 
25b   0.754 
(1.526) 
    2.886** 
(1.254) 
    3.888*** 
(1.445) 
‐4.026* 
(2.079) 
3b   ‐0.019 
(0.013) 
  ‐0.034***
(0.011) 
‐0.006 
(0.013) 
 
2   15.203*** 
(2.818) 
  8.735***
(1.669) 
5.960*** 
(1.408) 
 
a    
 
    3.011*** 
(0.652) 
1.148 
(0.710) 
  1.266*** 
(0.452) 
1.251** 
(0.500) 
lnL  ‐286.309  ‐279.627 ‐274.167 
Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically significant 
at 10% level. Values in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
 
   
Table B‐2 Stage Two Estimation for the Benchmark Model (Continued) 
parameter 
Model 4    Model 5    Model 6 
State 1  State 2    State1  State 2    State 1  State 2 
0b   11.639*** 
(1.944) 
3.067 
(2.400) 
  13.892*** 
(2.329) 
8.0068* 
(4.357) 
  14.703*** 
(2.440) 
5.710** 
(2.493) 
1d   1.189*** 
(0.071) 
    1.165*** 
(0.078) 
    1.065*** 
(0.084) 
 
2d   ‐0.477*** 
(0.061) 
    ‐0.457*** 
(0.071) 
    ‐0.349*** 
(0.078) 
 
11b   0.143 
(0.163) 
  ‐0.606**
(0.244) 
0.323
(0.249) 
‐0.027 
(0.185) 
0.077
(0.280) 
12b   0.040* 
(0.021) 
  0.014
(0.042) 
0.162***
(0.041) 
0.100*** 
(0.025) 
0.086*
(0.051) 
13b   0.066 
(0.070) 
    0.581*** 
(0.117) 
‐0.139 
(0.097) 
  0.103 
(0.076) 
‐0.015 
(0.170) 
14b   ‐0.110 
(0.100) 
    ‐0.481** 
(0.193) 
0.115 
(0.193) 
  0.180 
(0.145) 
0.167 
(0.217) 
21b   ‐0.063 
(0.266) 
    0.960* 
(0.514) 
‐0.883** 
(0.391) 
  ‐0.158 
(0.277) 
 
22b   0.118*** 
(0.028) 
    0.036 
(0.056) 
‐0.084 
(0.061) 
  ‐0.005 
(0.033) 
 
23b   ‐0.911***
(0.200) 
  ‐2.313***
(0.491) 
0.005
(0.285) 
‐1.150*** 
(0.218) 
 
24b   ‐6.718*** 
(1.667) 
    ‐4.601** 
(2.303) 
‐5.854 
(3.612) 
  ‐4.847** 
(2.131) 
 
25b   2.837** 
(1.251) 
    1.737 
(2.449) 
1.140 
(1.642) 
  0.549 
(1.434) 
 
3b   ‐0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.056** 
(0.028) 
  ‐0.011 
(0.013) 
    ‐0.002 
(0.013) 
0.056** 
(0.029) 
2   8.599*** 
(1.579) 
    7.062*** 
(1.183) 
    7.955*** 
(1.383) 
 
a   2.906***
(0.717) 
1.333* 
(0.721) 
2.193***
(0.619) 
2.262***
(0.690) 
2.740*** 
(0.827) 
2.340***
(0.622) 
lnL  ‐277.483    ‐268.035    ‐275.794 
Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically significant 
at 10% level. Values in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
 
 
Table B‐2 Stage Two Estimation for the Benchmark Model (Continued) 
parameter 
Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 
State 1  State 2    State1  State 2    State 1  State 2 
0b   10.527*** 
(3.153) 
7.086* 
(4.162) 
  17.902*** 
(2.202) 
5.832 
(4.408) 
  21.738*** 
(4.762) 
4.719** 
(2.193) 
1d   1.132*** 
(0.073) 
    1.115*** 
(0.059) 
    1.026*** 
(0.098) 
1.415*** 
(0.082) 
2d   ‐0.427*** 
(0.064) 
    ‐0.415*** 
(0.049) 
    ‐0.360*** 
(0.116) 
‐0.664*** 
(0.075) 
11b   0.194 
(0.158) 
    ‐0.053 
(0.187) 
0.231 
(0.244) 
  0.104 
(0.205) 
0.375*** 
(0.134) 
12b   0.040* 
(0.023) 
  ‐0.025
(0.038) 
0.170***
(0.036) 
0.018 
(0.044) 
0.098***
(0.025) 
13b   0.025 
(0.072) 
  0.285***
(0.085) 
‐0.061
(0.081) 
0.079 
(0.135) 
‐0.086
(0.064) 
14b   ‐0.106      ‐0.437***  0.126    ‐0.555***  0.095 
(0.098)  (0.140)  (0.154)  (0.184)  (0.090) 
21b   0.241 
(0.345) 
‐3.580*** 
(1.116) 
  ‐0.125 
(0.369) 
‐0.746 
(0.549) 
  0.399 
(0.534) 
‐1.061*** 
(0.327) 
22b   0.112*** 
(0.041) 
0.180** 
(0.075) 
0.152***
(0.035) 
‐0.058
(0.058) 
0.234*** 
(0.066) 
0.009
(0.030) 
23b   ‐0.865*** 
(0.253) 
‐0.002 
(0.668) 
‐1.711***
(0.269) 
0.237
(0.274) 
‐2.853*** 
(0.482) 
0.094
(0.163) 
24b   ‐6.510** 
(2.546) 
‐0.243 
(3.759) 
  ‐10.443*** 
(2.429) 
‐5.390 
(3.345) 
  ‐14.904*** 
(4.083) 
‐2.616 
(1.922) 
25b   2.779** 
(1.380) 
3.531 
(4.333) 
  5.872*** 
(2.144) 
0.765 
(1.460) 
  14.053*** 
(4.164) 
0.004 
(1.120) 
3b   ‐0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.096** 
(0.045) 
  ‐0.047*** 
(0.015) 
0.030 
(0.021) 
  ‐0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.026* 
(0.013) 
2   7.713*** 
(1.478) 
    4.881*** 
(1.109) 
    3.400*** 
(0.788) 
 
a   2.441*** 
(0.749) 
1.894** 
(0.745) 
0.922**
(0.455) 
0.820
(0.509) 
‐0.067 
(0.528) 
0.682**
(0.347) 
lnL  ‐269.506    ‐262.722    ‐254.905 
Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically significant 
at 10% level. Values in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
 
   
Table B3  Stage One Estimation of the Alternative Model 
Parameter  GDP  Stock Return  Amount of Trade Exchange Rate  Housing Return 
Constant  7.388** 
(2.955) 
14.971 
(13.667) 
1.463 
(5.363) 
‐1.440 
(2.642) 
25.205*** 
(7.715) 
GDP(‐1)  ‐0.095 
(0.946) 
‐0.540 
(4.377) 
2.214 
(1.718) 
‐0.289 
(0.846) 
‐0.138 
(2.471) 
Stock(‐1)  0.006 
(0.058) 
0.357 
(0.269) 
‐0.105 
(0.106) 
0.105** 
(0.052) 
‐0.112 
(0.152) 
FFR(‐1)  3.926*** 
(1.297) 
9.892* 
(5.998) 
3.924* 
(2.353) 
‐2.600** 
(1.160) 
6.307* 
(3.385) 
EFP(‐1)  ‐3.241 
(4.027) 
‐11.444 
(18.629) 
‐10.402 
(7.310) 
‐0.537 
(3.602) 
‐17.250 
(10.515) 
TED(‐1)  ‐2.928 
(2.579) 
‐7.408 
(11.929) 
‐1.449 
(4.681) 
1.638 
(2.306) 
1.998 
(6.734) 
Oil(‐1)  0.006 
(0.022) 
0.020 
(0.101) 
0.081** 
(0.040) 
‐0.031 
(0.019) 
0.095* 
(0.057) 
GDP(‐2)  0.822 
(1.380) 
‐7.040 
(6.383) 
1.867 
(2.505) 
‐0.093 
(1.234) 
‐0.723 
(3.603) 
Stock(‐2)  0.075 
(0.074) 
0.228 
(0.342) 
0.174 
(0.134) 
‐0.024 
(0.066) 
0.038 
(0.193) 
FFR(‐2)  ‐0.218 
(2.189) 
‐6.493 
(10.126) 
‐2.008 
(3.973) 
1.193 
(1.958) 
‐4.070 
(5.715) 
EFP(‐2)  ‐0.670 
(5.219) 
10.868 
(24.142) 
1.749 
(9.473) 
0.503 
(4.667) 
‐0.500 
(13.627) 
TED(‐2)  1.443 
(2.603) 
1.117 
(12.041) 
3.798 
(4.725) 
0.590 
(2.328) 
2.475 
(6.797) 
Oil(‐2)  0.010 
(0.028) 
‐0.148 
(0.127) 
0.028 
(0.050) 
‐0.018 
(0.025) 
‐0.000 
(0.072) 
GDP(‐3)  ‐1.578* 
(0.896) 
6.068 
(4.143) 
‐1.905 
(1.626) 
2.015** 
(0.801) 
‐2.964 
(2.338) 
Stock(‐3)  ‐0.013 
(0.058) 
‐0.103 
(0.266) 
‐0.111 
(0.104) 
‐0.030 
(0.051) 
0.019 
(0.150) 
FFR(‐3)  ‐3.143** 
(1.330) 
‐4.973 
(6.151) 
‐2.379 
(2.414) 
0.295 
(1.189) 
‐1.319 
(3.472) 
EFP(‐3)  3.613 
(3.555) 
5.762 
(16.444) 
11.336* 
(6.453) 
‐2.232 
(3.179) 
2.408 
(9.282) 
TED(‐3)  ‐0.101 
(2.254) 
‐3.388 
(10.428) 
‐3.759 
(4.092) 
1.501 
(2.016) 
‐3.209 
(5.886) 
Oil(‐3)  0.018 
(0.023) 
‐0.196** 
(0.105) 
‐0.012 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.020) 
‐0.097 
(0.059) 
Note: *** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically 
significant at 10% level. Values in parentheses represent the standard deviations. 
 
Table B4 Stage Two Estimation Results for Alternative Model (GDP‐dutta, S‐dutta, Trade‐dutta, 
Ex‐R‐dutta, H‐dutta) 
  Regime 1  Regime 2 
Parameter  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
(1)
0b   0.956  0.590  ‐3.139  35.286 
(11)
1b   0.505  0.411 1.069 28.177 
(12)
1b   0.020  0.045  0.076  12.379 
(13)
1b   ‐0.006  0.113  ‐0.212  4.173 
(14)
1b   0.013  0.215  0.055  23.642 
(15)
1b   ‐0.019  0.141  ‐0.135  21.047 
2
1   8.226***  3.084  8.226***  3.084 
1   1.000  (‐‐‐) 0.893 10.165 
(2)
0b   4.977  4.282  ‐16.842  725.426 
(21)
1b   ‐1.086  1.653  2.995  125.038 
(22)
1b   0.528**  0.262  0.204  20.229 
(23)
1b   0.400  0.606  ‐1.645  72.015 
(24)
1b   0.393  1.206  ‐1.755  135.029 
(25)
1b   ‐0.149  0.479  ‐0.253  34.995 
2
2   217.105***  58.591 217.105*** 58.591 
2   1.000  (‐‐‐) 0.958 28.468 
(3)
0b   2.167  1.481  ‐8.616  112.234 
(31)
1b   ‐0.122  0.562  1.219  27.021 
(32)
1b   ‐0.005  0.111  0.094  10.710 
(33)
1b   0.628***  0.230  0.024  5.665 
(34)
1b   ‐0.015  0.465  0.065  12.110 
(35)
1b   ‐0.077  0.284 ‐0.394 22.560 
2
3   31.891**  13.190 31.891** 13.190 
3   1.000  (‐‐‐)  0.558  8.904 
 
 
Table B4 Stage Two Estimation Results for Alternative Model (GDP‐dutta, S‐dutta, Trade‐dutta, Ex‐
R‐dutta, H‐dutta (Continued) 
  Regime 1  Regime 2 
Parameter  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
(4)
0b   ‐0.515  0.643  3.185  494.029 
(41)
1b   0.017  0.338 0.073 152.406 
(42)
1b   ‐0.025  0.041  0.026  17.868 
(43)
1b   0.040  0.101  0.133  93.804 
(44)
1b   0.624***  0.169  0.353  23.879 
(45)
1b   ‐0.010  0.079  ‐0.113  37.179 
2
4   6.526**  3.159  6.526**  3.159 
4   1.000  (‐‐‐) 1.515 29.549 
(5)
0b   1.600  1.927  ‐2.916  277.036 
(51)
1b   ‐0.012  0.776  ‐0.242  99.172 
(52)
1b   0.092  0.107  0.446  6.147 
(53)
1b   ‐0.162  0.269  0.008  37.686 
(54)
1b   0.038  0.583  ‐0.264  41.165 
(55)
1b   0.665***  0.231  0.226  11.116 
2
5   39.552***  10.796 39.552*** 10.796 
5   1.000  (‐‐‐) 0.646 5.408 
12r   0.353  0.215     
13r   0.597***  0.211     
14r   ‐0.117  0.295     
15r   0.468*  0.244     
23r   0.136  0.269     
24r   ‐0.026  0.300  
25r   0.489**  0.204  
34r   ‐0.148  0.310  
35r   0.504**  0.201     
45r   ‐0.324  0.307     
iiP   0.914***  0.124 0.704** 0.350 
lnL  1529.157
Note: *** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically 
significant at 10% level. 
 
 
